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WHAT OF STARE DECISIS?
ROSCOE POUNDt
A S THINGS are today, I cannot but think that much of the attack on
stare decisis is a part of the revival of absolutism which is so
prominent in political and juristic thought throughout the world. It goes
with the agitation for abrogation of the bills of rights, making the legis-
lature the sole judge of its own powers, and freeing administrative agencies
from judicial review, of which we have been hearing so much in recent
years. While we are doing away with checks and balances and putting
other forms of official action at large, why not turn the judiciary loose
also? Why not set up a regime of free decision that is to allow courts
to decide cases as unique with no obligation to a uniform, predictable
course of decision? All this is a phase of the general reaction from the
settled teaching of nineteenth-century America which opposed the deposit
of unlimited power anywhere. The thought of today is as intolerant of
limited governmental power as that of the last century was of absolute
power.
It is instructive to compare the demand of today that courts be free
to decide each case without reference either to past decisions or to other
like cases with the no less insistent demand in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, and even in the first decade of the present century,
that the courts should not be allowed to develop the traditional element of
our law, that they should not be permitted to develop experience by reason,
but that everything in the way of finding grounds of decision and practical
means of adjusting relations or ordering conduct should be done and
done only by legislation. The courts were to be confined to mechanical
logical application of fixed rules. . If they did anything more it was
branded usurpation. Perhaps the high water mark was reached a
generation ago when, on the one hand, the apostles of progress were
denouncing the courts for not amending the constitution by spurious
interpretation, and, on the other hand, the same writers and teachers were
attacking them for applying the ordinary canons of genuine interpretation
to give a statute a reasonable meaning. As is usual when such extreme
positions are taken, the truth lies between them.
t University Professor, Harvard University.
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At the outset we must clear the ground. Such a discussion as the
present must turn largely upon our idea of the legal order. It makes all
the difference what we take to be the end of social control through the
application of the force of politically organized society. We may think,
as men did in the past, of a systematic and uniform and predictable
application of that force in accordance with authoritative norms of
decision developed by an authoritative technique. On the other hand,
we may think, as many do today, in terms of adjustment of relations by
the force of politically organized society, with no necessary element of
system or order or predictability, defining law in terms of the judicial
process or the judicial and administrative processes, looked on as of the
same type, and take it that law is not something governing or to govern
official action, but that official action itself is law. If those are right who
maintain that legal precepts are nothing more than formulations of the
self-interest of a dominant social and economic class, and that single
decisions are inevitably dictated by class interest or prejudice, or if those
are right who assert that it is psychologically impossible for a bench of
judges to act objectively and impartially, that in fact every case will be
treated as unique and that legal reasoning and reference of decisions to
traditional or to statutory precepts is a hollow pretence to cover up an
arbitrary resort to prejudice, there is no need of debating about stare
decisis. It should go into the dust bin with all the rest of what the self-
styled realists call the superstition and mythology of the law. But it is
significant of how much the skeptical realists actually believe of their
extravagant assertions that they attack stare decisis, not as a deceptive bit
of pretence but as something which constrains and holds back the judicial
absolutism, which in another breath they assert actually exists already.
Indeed, they seem to hold that a regime of judicial no less than of
administrative absolutism ought to exist, although they often repudiate
as unscientific any idea of "ought" in the social sciences.
If we say with the skeptical realists that law is whatever is done
officially, we need not trouble ourselves about futile theories of how it
ought to be done, whether on a theory of hewing to written texts or one
of developing experience of past decision by an authoritative technique
or one of application of a personal hunch by an ex officio expert. If it
turns out that after all the economic order and human chafing under
subjection of the will of one to the arbitrary will of another do call for
system and order and predictability in the adjustment of relations, we
may turn to a superman administrative leader to keep what is done
officially to some tolerable limits of order and system.
Bentham attacked what we now call judicial lawmaking as usurpation,
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taking law to be an aggregate of laws and a statute to be the type of a
law. He believed in codification whereby the norms of decision were to be
ascertained and promulgated in detail, leaving to the courts no further
function than one of genuine interpretation of the relevant section for the
case in hand and fitting that case into appropriate code pigeon-holes by
a mechanical logical process. It is a curious feature of recent political
thought that critics of the common-law courts, on the one hand, repeat
the argument of Bentham and charge the courts with unwarranted making
of law when they should only apply law, and yet, on the other hand, charge
them with reactionary backwardness in not changing established precepts
of the traditional element of the legal system right and left to meet the
exigencies of single cases. But we must remember that in all legal history
the practice of mankind has swung back and forth between tying tribunals
down hard and fast by rigid rules of strict law at one extreme, and at the
other leaving them free to decide according to an unfettered personal
discretion.
In the nineteenth century the world was in reaction from the identifica-
tion of law with morals, the reference of all things to individual reason,
and the consequent personal justice of the era of equity and natural law
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the United States, in the
last half of the century, the reaction was especially strong. The colonists
had had abundant experience of personal justice under a regime in which
a royal governor and a council appointed by him were the upper house
of the legislature, the ultimate administrative agency and the ultimate
court of review. They knew well why it was that, when the colonies
became independent, they set up constitutions with bills of rights and
called for a government of laws and not of men. But ideas of natural
law, imported from Continental Europe were in the air, and in our
formative era gave shape to a doctrine that the common law of England
was received so far as applicable. The margin of judicial choice involved
in the term "applicable" and the gropings for a time in determining what
to receive and what to reject and replace alarmed Timothy Walker a
century ago, and his pronouncement against any such latitude of judicial
action was typical of the mode of thought which came to prevail in the
next generation.
As Timothy Walker was in reaction from a judicial process too much
at large, many law teachers of today are in reaction from the over-
strictness of the analytical theory of law as a body of logically inter-
dependent precepts imposed upon American law in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century. Bentham and his followers, the English analytical
jurists, taught us that the rule of property was the typical law and jurists
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strove valiantly for a time to make all legal precepts conform to that
type. Fifty years ago it was confidently believed that the law as to
negligence could be reduced to a body of rules, so that if one got on or off
a moving car, or stood on the platform of a moving car, or put an arm
out of the window of the car, it was negligence per se. One of the most
liberal, if not the most liberal, of our great American judges believed to
the end that the law required one who sought to cross a railroad track
to stop, look, and listen regardless of time, place, and circumstances.
In the nineteenth century we had a firm belief in history. In law, as
in every other branch of learning, we sought to understand things by
studying their development. The age of history is in the past. In law
particularly the history of institutions and doctrines is no longer ac-
counted a necessary part of teaching. We teach public law as if it had
been put in force by a fiat of a sovereign yesterday without the elaborate
introductory historical inquiry which was formerly a matter of course.
Hence there has come to be a tendency to forget what historically lies
behind the separation of powers and to assume it something growing
out of eighteenth century philosophical theories which we may well throw
over in the less rigid political and legal thinking of today. When our bills
of rights were framed the memory of the administrative tribunals of
Stuart England was green. Seventeenth-century England had had a hard
struggle with them, and for a time it had seemed that the common-law
courts in which judges were removed right and left for hewing to the law
instead of consulting the will of the King might be reduced to administra-
tive agencies of the crown. Coke's Second Institute, in which the
supremacy of the law, and the subjection of all officials of every kind and
grade to the law of the land were preached, became a legal bible to the
colonists after it was published by order of the Long Parliament.
Seventeenth and eighteenth-century America had a long experience of
undifferentiated control by administrative officials with lawmaking, ex-
ecutive and judicial powers, and with courts deciding after the manner
of administrative bodies and free from bonds of rules of law. Indeed, the
colonial courts were often both judicial and administrative in character.
It was only on the eve of the Revolution that some of the states began
to set off courts from administrative agencies. Often the legislature
was the ultimate court of review. When it was not, the Governor and
Council were often the highest court within the colony, and the Privy
Council in England was the final court of appeal. Moreover, the Board
of Trade and Plantations, another administrative body, had large powers
of control over colonial affairs. The Privy Council was not a court, as
it has come to be. It sometimes asked for the opinion of the Attorney-
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General. But for the most part the noblemen and gentlemen who at-
tended felt competent to pass on colonial legislation and recommend a
veto, to issue instructions to the royal governor controlling administration,
and to review the judgments of colonial courts by the light of nature with-
out having exercise of their discretion hampered by technicalities of law.
Moreover, colonial legislatures had been equally free to follow -individual
inclinations. They had by statute taken the title to land away from one
person and conferred it on another, they had adjudged persons guilty of
crimes and imposed punishments and confiscations, sometimes without
hearing and in the way of what have aptly been called legislative lynchings.
They had granted new trials to litigants defeated in the courts, probated
wills which the courts would not allow, given special directions as to the
administration of particular estates, and exempted particular litigants in
particular cases from the operation of the statute of limitations. This
sort of legislative justice died hard in some states after the Revolution.
But when we read that the legislature was appealed to in cases too flimsy
to take into court, we can understand why the first act of the independent
colonies in 1776 and thereafter was to frame a bill of rights declaring
for a separation of powers, and why Americans in the nineteenth century,
when historical study was held to show the orbit of development of
institutions, were firm for requiring uniform, stable, predictable action
from judges no less than from other public functionaries. Experience
shows there is something here to be maintained even at some sacrifice.
I repeat. The demand for courts as in effect part of the administrative
hierarchy, proceeding in the administrative rather than in the judical
manner, is part of the general revival of absolutism throughout the world.
In the last century those who believed in a universal ideal of law as a
body of logically interdependent precepts, urged that decisions be over-
ruled for want of conformity to their analytically ideal plan. The demand
for overruling decisions today comes in large part from those whose ideal
plan involves free decision of each case to the ideas of the moment accord-
ing to personal discretion.
Rightly understood, stare decisis is a feature of the common-law tech-
nique of decision. What is wrong in that technique, or in the exercise of
it by our courts, which is taken to call for giving it up? The common-law
technique is based on a conception of law as experience developed by
reason and reason tested and developed by experience. It is a technique
of finding the grounds of decision in recorded judicial experience, making
for stability by requiring adherence to decisions of the same question in
the past, allowing growth and change by the freedom of choice from
among competing analogies of equal authority when new questions arise
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or old ones take on new forms. In that technique there is a distinction
between binding authority and persuasive authority. The decision of the
ultimate court of review in a common-law jurisdiction is held to bind all
inferior courts of that jurisdiction and also the court itself in future
cases involving the question of law decided or at least necessary to the
decision rendered. Beyond that it may furnish an analogy and be the
basis of legal reasoning upon new and different questions raised by
different states of fact. But there are usually other analogies of like
persuasive authority to be considered and the court's choice is a free one
with reference to received ideals of what the social and economic order
require. In other jurisdictions it is only persuasive, to be taken as a
starting point for judicial reasoning so far as it appeals to the court.
Just how binding is "binding authority" in our common-law technique?
A single decision has never been regarded as absolutely binding at all
events. But, on the other hand, it had become established that nothing
less than an overriding conviction that a precept fixed by a prior decision
was contrary to the principles of the law so that it had an ill effect upon
the process of determining new questions by analogical reasoning and
was, as Blackstone puts it, "flatly" unjust in its results, could justify
judicial rejection of it. Perhaps it is as well that the exact limits of this
term "binding authority" have never been rigidly defined. All definition
says Coke, quoting from the Digest of Justinian, is perilous. The doctrine
is a check upon judicial action that ought not to be thrown off in the
general pressure to throw off limitations on official action.
But what is it that calls for rejection of the doctrine within the com-
paratively narrow limits within which it obtains? One type of case
where it used to be objected to was rules of procedure established by
judicial decision. Today there is ceasing to be need of overhauling
procedure by judicial overrulings of the course of decision. The need is
being obviated by committing details of procedure to rules of court which
may be changed by the courts as experience dictates. Another type of
case which has caused irritation at the doctrine is to be seen in decisions
establishing certain states of fact as constituting negligence. For instance,
there is the stop, look, and listen rule as applied to motor trucks crossing
railroad tracks on which streamlined trains are operated. Here applica-
tion of a standard of due care is involved, and this is a very different thing
from finding and formulating a rule of law. The legal precept defines a
standard, but there is no set of detailed precepts fitting each case into the
standard. That is a matter for each case just as the defining of the
standard, on the other hand, is a matter of cases generally to be governed
by a rule of law. A decision as to what was reasonable when fast trains
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went forty miles an hour and people crossed tracks in horse drawn
vehicles is not overruled by not applying it as a measure of reasonableness
when trains go from seventy to one hundred miles an hour on double
tracks or even four lines of tracks and crossing is done in motor vehicles.
It should be noted also that when definite detailed states of fact vary
markedly, rules cease to be more than starting points of analogical reason-
ing. In most cases other analogies are at hand so that a more satisfactory
starting point for the different state of facts may be found and the question
may be put on a basis in touch with the exigencies of the time and place by
the ordinary technique of drawing a distinction. Rules which attach a
definite detailed legal consequence to a definite detailed state of facts have
usually a relatively short life because of changes which eliminate the state
of facts to which they were applicable and leave only an analogy, of
persuasive force for what it is worth, where there may have been a binding
legal precept.
Then, too, we must distinguish subsequent judicial rejection of the
reasoning by which the result was reached in a prior case and substitution
of different reasoning leading to the same result, from a changed course of
decision requiring a different result. It ought not to be necessary to say
this. But one encounters constantly statements that a line of prior
decisions has been overruled and a new line of decisions has been in-
augurated, when all that has been done is to announce a better or more
all embracing line of reasoning which will sustain the old decisions and
lead to better results in new ones which have come up for the first time.
Much harm has been done to our common-law technique in America by
text writers in the decadence of text writing in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century, and by hack writers in encyclopaedias dogmatically
announcing rules in terms of the exact words of courts without attending
to the results of the cases as compared with the language of decisions.
It often requires a long process of judicial inclusion and exclusion to
work out a principle or a number of principles which will put a series
of new cases in some field of the law in the order of reason and to
enable us to formulate a body of rules with assurance. The language
may have to be altered many times in successive opinions of the courts,
and yet when the development is complete and we look back over the long
line of decisions we may see that the cases at the beginning of the line
would still be decided as they were when they arose. The language of
earlier cases has been repudiated and no doubt ought to have been
rejected in the light of further experience. But the results reached remain
the same, are consistent throughout the course of decision, and in the
end have yielded a workable principle. It is not infrequent to hear it
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said in connection with cases of this sort that the highest courts have
reversed themselves repeatedly, when they have done nothing of the sort.
If anything or any one has been overruled it is the hasty text writer or
hasty opinion writer who ventured to formulate general propositions
on the basis of insufficient data while a subject was still formative. It
cannot be insisted upon too often that our common-law technique does
not make the language authoritative, much less of binding authority. It
is the result that passes into the law.
I do not overlook such cases as the recent overruling by the Supreme
Court of Oregon of its prior decisions following the now thoroughly
repudiated doctrine announced by the New York Court of Appeals in
1871 as to one rogue cheating a credulous would-be rogue, nor such cases
as the giving up of various rules as to imputed negligence which grew up
here and there in the train of Thorogood v. Bryan. These cases are
squarely within Blackstone's proposition and serve to show that the
common-law technique is quite equal to situations that clearly call for
judicial without waiting for legislative action. Nor do I overlook such
cases as McPherson v. Buick Motor Company in America and Donoghue
v. Stevenson in Great Britain. Many have spoken of the former as sweep-
ing judicial departure. Certainly these cases did make obsolete a great
deal of language in the books. But the general principle of negligence had
for a long time been coming to be better understood and the merit of the
two decisions is that they sum up a course of development which had been
taking place according to the traditional technique of the common law
and go upon the principle underlying our whole experience of deciding
as to liability for negligence rather than -upon logical development of
language used in a particular type of early cases which tried out a principle
out of line with the general law and not justified as an exception by its
results. Moreover, the cases had largely been reaching what we now
regard as the right result by reasoning which may be given up without
affecting that result. rThere is no departure here from the common-law
technique.
One may make a like observation as to recent cases which some have
urged overrule older decisions and infringe the constitutional separation
of powers. Some of them do no more than recognize that application
of a standard may be quite as much an administrative as a judicial function
and hence may be committed to an administrative agency where involved
incidentally in administration as it is. left to courts where involved in-
cidentally in adjudication. The others were explained long ago by Chief
Justice Marshall. Where there are powers of doubtful classification, such
as rate-making, for example, it is a legislative function to assign them to
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an appropriate department. The supposed difficulty in these cases arose
from an unwarranted assumption that every power could go only in one
place and that there could not be any, and we now know there are many,
which, whether looked at analytically or historically, could be put equally
well under more than one department. Here, again, the language of law
books has been overruled, not the course of decision.
It should be added that as to commercial law, where in any event the
orthodox technique allowed greater margin for judicial overruling of prior
decisions in order to achieve and maintain uniformity among the several
states, uniform state laws have taken care of the subject as to all the
important questions and if any not so taken care of arise, the recognized
latitude for attaining uniformity by judicial decision will suffice without
resorting to any drastic general change of method.
There are real difficulties in the judicial process that I do not pretend
to deny nor seek to ignore. But those which give rise today to attafks
upon stare decisis have to do more with interpretation of constitutional
and statutory precepts and with application of standards than with the
following of established precepts determined by judicial decision. There
are three elements in the body of authoritative materials of decision, a
precept element, a technique element, and an ideal element. In inter-
pretation and in the application of standards the ideal element is the
ultimate determinant. At bottom, that element comes to a received ideal
picture of the social order of the time and place made to furnish an ideal
of the legal order. Questions of the intrinsic merit of possible interpreta-
tions, questions of reasonableness, always involved in the application of
standards, are measured with reference to this picture. In the last century
it was a clear one. It was a picture of pioneer, rural, agricultural America
of our formative era. That is not a picture of the society of today in
urban, industrial communities and is less so in all, but in varying degrees
in different, parts of the land. But we have not formed any clear ideal
of an urban industrial society and much less an ideal of a society which
presents a variety of shades from a rural agricultural society at one end
to a highly industrial society at the other. It is here that jurists ought to
be making the attack. We need a critique of our traditional re-received
ideal. We need to learn how to redraw it and then redraw it clearly.
It is not wise social engineering to administer justice today by a blue print
of American society of one hundred years ago. But we shall not achieve
this critique, we shall not further this redrawing or reshaping of our
received ideal by setting the administration of justice at large and turning
to judicial and administrative absolutism.
I have pointed to a real grievance with our administration of justice
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upon which we ought to be at work. But beyond this is not part of the
supposed mischief that is taken to call for giving up of an essential
feature of the technique of decision in the English-speaking world simply
that this age is in a hurry while the courts are and ought to be cautious?
The courts in the past have not been ready to overturn established precepts
with every swing of political and economic opinion, especially when they
swing so much and so fast. These sudden changes, making new rules
operating for the future are for the legislature. The courts, it must be
remembered, establish precepts for past and future cases alike. Indeed,
when they overrule a decision of the past, they subject a transaction or
situation of the past to a different rule of law than that which obtained
and applied to it when it took place. Hence English-speaking peoples
universally have felt that a check upon the judicial power was needed.
The bills of rights seek to preclude retroactive legislation of a kind of
which Americans had experience in the colonies. Judicial decision is of
necessity retroactive. The court works out a legal precept or finds one
in order to apply it to a set of facts occurring in the past. A check upon
judicial action is found in the settled practice of courts in the common-
law world requiring the courts to apply an authoritative technique to
authoritative materials of decision. By that technique the balance of
stability and change is assured and maintained.
If what I have been saying is well taken, the causes of dissatisfaction
which lead to attacks upon stare decisis are not in that doctrine but rather
in our technique of applying standards and in the ideal element of law
which is decisive in applying standards. Let us approach the subject in
the classical manner of the common law. Let us consider the old law,
the mischief, and the remedy. To my mind the chief cause of complaint
grows out of the mode of thinking about law in the nineteenth century
which put law as an aggregate of laws, took law to be of necessity a rule,
and took a rule of property to be the type and model of a rule. There
is much more to law in the sense of the body of authoritative materials of
decision, and much more to the precept element of that body of materials
than rules attaching definite detailed consequences to definite detailed
states of fact. An increasingly important type of precept in the law of
today establishes and prescribes standards. The precept prescribing
due care in a course of conduct not to subject others to unreasonable risk
of injury and prescribing liability to repair resulting injury in case that
standard is not adhered to, does not lay down a definite detailed state
of facts nor affix to such a state of facts a definite detailed legal con-
sequence. Due process of law is a standard. There is a precept in the
Constitution prescribing that legislative and executive action shall not be
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arbitrary and unreasonable. It prescribes that standard. But there are
no precepts anywhere defining reasonableness or prescribing in detail
what is unreasonable. Nor can there be in the nature of things. The
most that can be done is to measure action by its conformity or want of
conformity to a received authoritative ideal, and that ideal itself must
change with changes in the society of which it is a picture. Application
of a standard in the light of a received ideal must be a matter of times
and places and circumstances. What was a negligent speed in a horse
drawn cart is not a negligent speed in an automobile. What was unreason-
able in a rural agricultural society is not necessarily unreasonable in an
urban industrial society. What was unreasonable under the circumstances
of yesterday may or may not be under the circumstances of tomorrow.
I repeat. It is the idea of law as no more than an aggregate of laws, and
that a law is of necessity a rule of the type of a rule of property, that is at
fault. If the difference between application of such a rule and application
of a standard is seen and borne in mind, it will be apparent that decisions
as to what was arbitrary and unreasonable under conditions of the past
are not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis unless the conditions
of the time and place and the surrounding circumstances are the same.
It is impossible to have at the same time a perfect stability, a complete
certainty and predictability in the judicial process, and a perfect flexibility,
a complete instant adaptation to the requirements of changes in the social
and economic order. The best that can be done is to maintain a balance
between them which will give as much effect as we can to each consistently
with not impairing the other. This is achieved by finding and establishing
principles, authoritative starting points for legal reasoning, which enable
new situations to be dealt with in the light of experience and rules to grow
out of application of experience. A good example of the creative judicial
lawmaking which the common-law technique permits may be seen in the
matter of aviators flying over the air space above land. If one thought
in terms of rules only this might have been thought to contravene the old
maxim as to ownership indefinitely upward. But the type of transporta-
tion was new and the maxim expressed no more than what experience had
developed in the past. There was at hand in the authoritative materials
of decision not only the maxim but also the settled privilege of boating
and fishing over the privately owned bed of streams. There was no break
in the consistent course of decision, there was no breach of any established
rule of law in developing the doctrine of a new subject from the analogy
of that privilege.
So much for the old law, that is, the teaching that all law could be made
and administered to the pattern of rules of property and that the ideal
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element could be ignored or excluded, and the mischief, that is, the effect
of that teaching on the application of standards which have come to be
an instrument of chief importance in the legal order of today. Now what
of the remedy? For rules and settled principles which require change,
except in a few extreme cases, the orthodox common-law technique looks
to legislation to abrogate the old and formulate and establish the new
precept. The English courts have been and are firm in adherence to this
doctrine. But a few months ago the House of Lords was confronted with
the remnants of the fellow servant rule which had not been done away
with by Workmen's Compensation laws. Lord Wright put tersely the
unanimous view of the Lords of Appeal, saying: "This house cannot
usurp the function of the legislature in a matter of this nature." Lord
Westbury and Mr. Justice Brandeis, who will certainly rank among the
most liberal of common-law judges, have both insisted upon this in clear
and vigorous terms, not only as to rules of property, but as to rules
governing conduct. As Mr. Justice Holmes put it, judicial lawmaking
is interstitial only.
It is true the legislature is slow in dealing with defects in the law
governing the relations of man and man and has been increasingly dis-
inclined to trouble itself with what is called "lawyer's law". The legis-
lative process calls for scrutiny quite as much as the judicial process and
reform there is at least as urgent as reform in the courts. Where radical
readjustment of achieved legal balances, as for example, the balance
between security and liability on a basis of culpability, which runs through
the law of torts, is required, the courts cannot be asked to turn the whole
course of judicial decision to the right about at one stroke. If they
attempted to do this while new ideas of justice were formative and at large,
there would be judicial anarchy. In England, the Law Revision Com-
mittee recommends abolition of the requirement of consideration in simple
contracts. Would any one recommend its abolition by judicial decision?
The committee also recommends repeal of parts of the statute of frauds.
Is there any substantial difference between judicial abrogation in the one
case and judicial assumption of a power of repeal in the other?
Caution is necessary in introducing new ideas by judicial decision rather
than by legislation because in the technique of our law judicial decisions
are starting points for legal reasoning. They are developed by analogy
for other cases. On the other hand, statutes make rules only for the cases
within their purview. Hence when a new proposition comes in by legis-
lation it does not disturb the general legal system, no matter how radically
it departs from what went before. But when something radically new
comes in by judicial decision, no one can foretell what its disturbing effects
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may be. It not merely decides the exact state of facts which it served to
adjudicate, it is potentially a starting point for analogical reasoning for
cases in widely distinct parts of the legal system. That a court has over-
turned rule A at once puts rules B, C, and D, rules M, and N, and rules
P, and Q in question, because all rules at all analogous to A are likely to be
challenged on the analogy of rule X which has taken the place of A.
It is not stare decisis that the law reformer should be assailing. Amer-
ican courts have been quite sufficiently inclined to rectify obvious, clearly
demonstrated mistakes in the light of reason applied to experience.
What needs rectification is a judicial habit of following language extracted
from its setting by text writers, of adherence to formulas instead of to the
principle of decisions, and the taking of the words for law rather than the
judicial action which those words sought to explain. Again, it is not stare
decisis which is at fault in the large domain of the legal order which is
ruled by standards. It is the failure to differentiate between rule and
standard and the attempt to reduce application of standards to hard and
fast rules. Even more in all cases where the present generation is troubled
about stare decisis, the real difficulty is with the blue print to which courts
interpret legal precepts, choose starting points for legal reasoning, and
apply standards. Here we have a difficult problem at a time when ideals
of justice are in flux. It makes the balance between stability and change,
always hard to keep, doubly difficult. But we must be thinking about this
ideal element in our law, and how to criticize and organize it, rather than
thrashing over old straw about stare decisis.
If legislation is not doing its part, we should be thinking about how to
make legislative bodies equal to the task. Bar association committees,
the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Law Revision
Committees, and in particular Judicial Councils are meeting the demand
for better preparation for legislative correction of defects in the law.
Legislation prepared by a legislative committee of some special organized
interest has been the bane of American legislation on matters of sub-
stantive law and procedure. A ministry of justice is the effective remedy.
While that is coming, the law teacher and the profession should make
the best use of the judicial council, which is the most effective substitute
at hand.
In conclusion I would say as St. Paul did to Timothy: "We know that
the law ls good if a man use it lawfully."
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